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Data providers holding sensitive medical data often need to exchange data pertaining to
patients for whom they hold particular data. This involves requesting information from other
providers to augment the data they hold. However, revealing the superset of identifiers for
which a provider requires information can, in itself, leak sensitive private data. Data linkage
services exist to facilitate the exchange of anonymized identifiers between data providers.
Reliance on third parties to provide these services still raises issues around the trust,
privacy and security of such implementations. The rise and use of blockchain and
distributed ledger technologies over the last decade has, alongside innovation and
disruption in the financial sphere, also brought to the fore and refined the use of
associated privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols and techniques. These
techniques are now being adopted and used in fields removed from the original
financial use cases. In this paper we present a combination of a blockchain-native
auditing and trust-enabling environment alongside a query exchange protocol. This
allows the exchange of sets of patient identifiers between data providers in such a
way that only identifiers lying in the intersection of sets of identifiers are revealed and
shared, allowing further secure and privacy-preserving exchange of medical information to
be carried out between the two parties. We present the design and implementation of a
system demonstrating the effectiveness of these exchange protocols giving a reference
architecture for the implementation of such a system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing prevalence of electronic health record (EHR) data and its use for both administrative
and research purposes has generated the ability for data consumers to derive novel and unexpected
results from an increased breadth of available data. Data linkage is the process of combining disparate
data sources into a single source, in particular unifying items of data that relate to the same entity
identifier and extending the available set of information that pertain to a given individual. Through
linking data sets in such a way data consumers, that is the data scientists or administrative analysts,
can access richer sources of data and derive otherwise inaccessible results.
While there are clear benefits to providing the ability to link data sources in this way, there are
serious issues of privacy to consider. Data Linkage systems need to ensure that privacy maintained,
both in terms of ensuring pseudonymized or protected data remains hidden and in preventing
information leakage through sharing data that was it not necessary to share in order to link data.
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data through incorrectly authenticated requests to link data,
incorrect linkage of non-related entities and the increase in
potential security attack surface. Currently data linkage
systems often rely on a trusted third party to link data to
mitigate against the privacy risks inherent in linking data
between individually sensitive sources. These trusted third
parties act as a firewall between individual data sources and
act to preserve the privacy of the records being linked and to
provide guarantees regarding data integrity.
Blockchain is the core set of technologies derived from the
underlying architecture of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency—a
decentralized, trustless digitally based form of currency. A
blockchain is an immutable data structure that encodes a
ledger of signed transactions between cryptographically
encoded addresses in as a chain of time-ordered blocks of
data. The approach taken by Bitcoin as originally conceived
was a means of addressing the ‘Byzantine Generals’ problem
(that is the problem of communicating canonical information
between a group of peers where certain members of that group
may be untrustworthy) for particular use within the financial
domain. It has also subsequently found wider adoption in fields
outside of finance. While there has been a lot of hype and
overpromize regarding the applicability and usefulness of
blockchain in many areas, there have still been a number of
innovative and successful uses of the technology. In the medical
field in particular blockchain technologies have found legitimate
use in a number of areas. The underlying primitives of blockchain
implementations are cryptographic in nature which is of use in
terms of both ensuring privacy and providing mechanisms to
prevent data leakage. In the context of medical data, and
particularly the protection of privacy within data being used
and transmitted, these features are of particular importance.
In this paper we analyze the requirements for a system of
medical data linkage that utilizes core blockchain functionality in
place of a trusted third party linkage provider. We then present a
reference architecture that will enable the creation and use of such
a system. The remainder of this section discusses in more depth
relevant aspects of blockchain technology and data linkage.
1.1 Blockchain
Bitcoin is a decentralized crypto-currency proposed and
originally implemented in 2009 by the pseudonymous Satoshi
Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2009). Originally envisaged as a form of
electronic cash that could be implemented without the need for
reliance on a centralized or trusted third party to ensure the
validity of transactions, Bitcoin has grown from a nascent
network protocol with participating nodes in the network
producing unvalued ‘coins’, to having a market cap of around
700 billion US dollars at the time of writing. Previous efforts to
implement similar ideas had failed to successfully address the
issue of ‘double spending’—given an electronic asset that is hence
easily duplicated, how can a system prevent the transmission of
that asset (where it acts as a unit of value) to two separate parties
simultaneously, thus undermining the perceived value that asset
holds. For an electronic system having a central database
(controlled and verified by a ‘third party’ with respect to the
transaction taking place) addresses this problem, but for
philosophical and political reasons there was the perceived
need for a system not reliant on such a trusted third party.
Such a decentralized system would need to rely on a network of
nodes acting such that a canonical ordering of transactions was
passed between nodes, ensuring that assets could not be double
spent. However given that there is clear economic incentive for
nodes to ‘cheat’ in certain circumstances the protocol underlying
the network would need to be constructed in such a way as to
ensure honesty between peers. The problem of ensuring the
honest communication of canonical information between
potentially untrustworthy nodes in a network is, in general,
conceived of as the ‘Byzantine Generals Problem’ (Avizienis
et al., 2004). The solution presented by the Bitcoin protocol
was via the creation of the blockchain data structure.
A blockchain is a ledger of transaction consisting of a time-
ordered series of ‘blocks’ of data. Each block contains a list of
signed transactions between addresses (in the Bitcoin protocol
addresses are the hashes of public keys, where transactions can be
signed by the corresponding private key) along with a hash of the
previous block in the chain. Bitcoins highly novel innovation as a
protocol was that, to ensure that there was an agreed upon
canonical chain of blocks (thus comprising a common
distributed ledger of transactions) each block would also
contain a salt value such that the hashed value of the block
fell below a certain number. Valid blocks could thus be produced
by nodes ‘mining’ salt values for blocks by guessing multiple
values for the salt until a valid one was found. This ensures that
blocks can be produced at controlled time intervals in an agreed
upon manner underpinned by the protocol. A valid block also
rewards the producer of that block with additional bitcoin,
ensuring an economic incentive to produce blocks in the chain.
Removed from the economic value of the currency it encodes
and its application as a ‘store of value,’ Bitcoin, via the blockchain
data structure mechanism, exhibits core properties of:
• Security–the public key underpinnings of blockchain
technology ensure that information stored in the digital
ledger that a blockchain provides is cryptographically sound.
• Decentralization–blockchains are produced and secured by
decentralized networks of nodes acting as equal peers in the
network. There is no single source of trust that operation of
the network relies on.
• Consensus–the economic incentive to produce blocks, and
the corresponding cost of producing competing chains of
blocks to undermine the currently agreed upon order,
ensures that there is consensus between nodes in the
network as to what information has been recorded in the
distributed ledger.
• Immutability–the fact that each block in a blockchain data
structure must contain a hash of the previous block in the
chain means that no information recorded in the ledger can
be removed; data recorded on a blockchain is, by definition,
immutable.
Following the launch and success of the Bitcoin currency the
blockchain technology has been further utilized in an ever
growing number of alternative crypto-currencies, with varying
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degrees of difference to the bitcoin protocol; most notably
Ethereum (Buterin, 2016) which introduced the concept of
smart contracts (computational rule based transactional
specifications that can record additional data on the chain and
conditionally control currency transactions). Beyond the crypto-
currency space though blockchain technology has been utilized,
with varying degrees of validity and success in a number of other
fields (Miraz and Ali, 2018). To an extent some of these
applications can be seen as solutions in search of a problem,
often adding little of value over non blockchain-based solutions
(Golosova and Romanovs, 2018). However, where one or more of
the core features we have highlighted (namely security,
decentralization, consensus and immutability of data) are
necessary properties of a potential solution then blockchain
technology can offer genuine progress in a given area
(Underwood, 2016). In particular, the properties of security
and consensus can be seen as particularly relevant to the
healthcare domain.
1.2 Blockchain in Digital Health
In the healthcare domain in particular the properties of
blockchain can find genuine application in a range of areas
(Angraal et al., 2017; Hölbl et al., 2018; Agbo et al., 2019).
Active research in the application of the technology to health
informatics ranges from the potential use of the blockchain as a
means to store and process medical records (Zhang and Ji, 2018),
being used as a permissions management layer (Azaria et al.,
2016), through use as an administrative tool (Cyran, 2018), to
applications in supply chain management (Clauson et al., 2018).
Looking in particular at applications from the perspective of the
properties offered by blockchain, namely security,
decentralization, consensus and immutability, we can see that
these different properties can be leveraged by health informatics
applications across a variety of use cases.
1.2.1 Security
Guardtime (Williams-Grut, 2016) is an organization providing
‘zero trust’ systems aimed at governmental and enterprise level
clients utilizing the KSI blockchain stack (Nagasubramanian
et al., 2020). A particular application provided by the
Guardtime platform is vaccine guard, which aims to securely
and efficiently provide and record Covid 19 vaccination records
against patient identities, while preserving the privacy of the
individual to whom the vaccination data pertains (Vazirani et al.,
2019). The vaccine guard system combines information about a
formally identified patient, with vaccination data and verification
by registered healthcare organisations. This information is
recorded on a blockchain. The use of blockchain technology
here is reliant on the security that the blockchain provides in
terms of the cryptographic soundness of the verification protocols
used to establish authenticity of certificates and the guarantees
provided by the underlying protocol that prevent the forgery,
replication or deletion of validly recorded information.
1.2.2 Decentralization
The Carechain project seeks to enable patients “to offer both
healthcare professionals and researchers access to their entire
health history as well as to directly purchase services in a global
marketplace to improve their health” (Leeming et al., 2019). This
provision of a marketplace mechanism for patient data and
services is enabled and mediated via the public Ethereum
blockchain network. Marketplace mechanisms rely on
efficiency of the communication of price and availability data
and the establishment of peer-to-peer mechanisms for matching
marketplace participants. Key to the engendering of both trust
and reliability in such a system is the decentralized nature of the
underlying blockchain technology. Removing any central point of
failure enhances both the security and reliability of the market
place and promotes fairness between provider and purchaser,
where, particularly in the case of healthcare data, there is potential
for patients to be taken advantage, breaking inherent ethico-legal
constraints (Hoffman, 2015).
1.2.3 Consensus
Medrec is system that enables patients to control and enable
access to medical records and healthcare provision information
from different sources (Azaria et al., 2016). The Medrec system
records metadata about medical records and enables access and
use of these records by patients and authorized organisations. The
implementation of the Medrec system uses blockchain
technology to enable medical record providers to record and
share information regarding this access. The mechanism used by
Medrec enables groups of verified providers to efficiently come to
consensus agreement as to the validity and meaning of the
metadata being shared.
1.2.4 Immutability
The MediLedger Project from Chronicled provides a blockchain-
based system for Pharmaceutical supply chain (Mattke et al.,
2019). The project is a cross pharmaceutical industry initiative
enabling participating organisations to meet the requirements of
the US Drug Supply Chain Security Act (Brechtelsbauer et al.,
2016). Using a private blockchain instance organisations can
track and trace the supply and provision of pharmaceutical
products (Woods and Iyengar-Emens, 2019). The immutability
of blockchain data ensures that information about events
recorded at specific times regarding supply chain events can
be trusted to have been accurately recorded and not altered or
revoked, allowing for accurate auditing and proof of compliance
with relevant legislation.
1.3 Data Linkage
Data Linkage can be defined as the act of combining “two or more
different sources, data that relate to the same individual, family,
place or event” (Holman et al., 2008). While potentially done
using paper-based medical record sources, the shift of medical
data into predominantly digital forms (Johnson et al., 2014) has
increased the ease with which linkage between data sets can be
performed. The ability to link disparate data sets into single
unified sources brings benefits in both the administrative and
research spheres in terms of the ability to bring about novel
results (Dong and Srivastava, 2013). Linked administrative data
can benefit healthcare organisations financially and enhance
clinical management practices (Harron et al., 2017). Research-
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oriented data sets when combined, can drive novel research in
areas ranging from population-level studies (Medalia et al., 2019),
to results studies of eating disorders for example (Demmler et al.,
2020).
Given that it is medical data that is being linked, there are a
particular set of privacy and ethico-legal concerns that constrain
the way in which data can be linked (Willison et al., 2008;
Haddow et al., 2011). Linked data, derived from two sub-sets
of information about a given entity being combined, may disclose
otherwise private information about that entity (Zheng et al.,
2018). Techniques exist that can preserve privacy during linkage
of records (Schnell et al., 2009) or offer pooled analysis of results
without revealing private information (Wolfson et al., 2010).
Even where disclosure of information does not take place
though there is the issue of whether explicit patient consent
should be required in linking personal data (Xafis, 2015). A
further point at which information leakage can occur during
data linkage is if a subset of identifiers in one data set is not
present in the dataset being linked to (Niedermeyer et al., 2014). If
that subset of identifiers is then passed to the corresponding data
provider, in the act of linking the two sets, then information not
previously known by the second provider has now been revealed.
This information in itself can be extremely sensitive (for example
the presence of a patient identifier in a particular sexual health
registry).
In order to ensure privacy protections and to enact ethico-
legal constraints on the construction and distribution of
linked data sets, most data linkage systems employ a
Trusted Third Party (TTP) mechanism (Niedermeyer et al.,
2014). A TTP is an organization or software system separate
and distinct from the parties providing data, which assumes
responsibility for matching identifiers across data sets,
imposing privacy preserving constraints on the data such
as the pseudonymization and anonymization of relevant
identifiers, and the distribution linked data sets to the
requestor of the data (Harron et al., 2016). The reliance on
TTPs to facilitate data linkage also exposes them as a singular
point of failure in terms of system security and reliability
(Durham et al., 2013). While there exist approaches to
removing the use of a TTP through probabilistic methods
(Lazrig et al., 2018) for example, data linkage systems that
require a) accurate matching between identifiers and b)
guarantees around preventing disclosure of private
information (both features particularly prevalent in medical
linkage systems), are not suited to probabilistic approaches
and must again rely on a TTP model.
In the remainder of this paper we present a reference
architecture of a system that allows the role of the trusted
third party in data linkage applications to be replaced by a
decentralized and trust-less mechanism provided through the
use of blockchain technology.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Using an architecture that relies on a trusted third party for data
linkage exposes a number of weaknesses: the TTP can be a single
point of failure, there is potential for trust to be compromised
either maliciously or accidentally and it presents a single attack
surface for security adversaries. A system that could remove this
reliance on a trusted third party would represent a step forward
in terms of the usability and applicability of such systems. We
looked to design a reference architecture that would serve as a
guide for designing more complex systems based around the
need for participating data providers to link datasets to provide
to data consumers (such as research organisations). In order to
proceed with this design we constructed two related sets of
requirements for the architecture. First, from an analysis of the
factors that need to be accounted for in designing such a system,
we drew out a set of requirements in terms of the general
principles that such a system should follow. Second, taking as
our starting point the use of blockchain technology as the
mechanism by which we would enable the trust-less linking
of data, we derived the core technical requirements that the
system should exhibit.
2.1 Generic System Requirements
The development of a system which aims to enable the sharing of
patient data that is otherwise held and controlled by individual
healthcare organisations needs to meet a set of requirements that
are based around the value needs of the various stakeholders
involved in the control of the records. The requirements of the
various groups of stakeholders (management, db administrators,
etc) involved in the management of patient data can generally be
seen as being fairly homogenous between those groups–i.e., there
are a consistent set of principles that drive localized use and
management of patient records. From our analysis of stakeholder
needs we drew out the following set of requirements pertaining to
general features that a trust-less data linkage platform should
exhibit.
• Historical–For an existing system with as rich an historical
background as medicine, simple inertia and a natural
conservatism play a large part in determining the extent
that radical change can be tolerated. Elements of the system
designed to accommodate or allay this resistance to change
are classified as historical requirements. In the case of
medical record provision and access meeting these
historically driven requirements translate to maintaining
as much of existing provisioning as possible; radical
redesign impacting on existing infrastructure is to be
avoided where possible.
• Political–Stemming from, but distinct to, historically driven
requirements are those that can be categorized as politically
motivated. The subject of electronic health records,
particularly aspects relating to security, is highly
politically charged and many aspects of electronic
healthcare system design need to cater to the fact that
often appearance trumps practical issues. Relating in
particular to the adoption of a new (and potentially
controversial) technology such as blockchain, such
political considerations translate into a need to minimize
any over reliance or over emphasis on this technology where
not strictly necessary.
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• Social–Even within the data-centric world of electronic
patient records the use of those records is driven by
human interaction. Doctors make use of the records to
treat patients, with the protection of the patient’s
wellbeing being at the heart of medical practice. Human,
or social, pressures therefore play a significant role in the
potential use of electronic records. If systems supporting
such records are perceived to have a negative net impact on
individual needs (such as the protection of privacy and the
avoidance of commercial exploitation) then, regardless of
technical merit, they will tend not to be adopted.
• Commercial–Even within the UK’s publicly funded
monolithic NHS commercial sensibilities, driven by the
existance of an internal market, impact on the desire of
healthcare organisations to share data. In healthcare
systems with more of an emphasis on private healthcare
provision (the US healthcare system being the natural
example) such commercial concerns come even more to
the fore. Data linkage systems act as glue between existing
medical data sets, and such data sets carry commercial
value. If the design of a system that enables data linkage
removes direct control of data from the data provider
organisations, then it can also have the effect of
damaging commercial concerns. As such the system
design should not remove existing ultimate control of
access to data from data providers.
• Legal–Where patient data is captured in electronic form the
protection and confidentiality of that information is
recognized as being of primary importance. As such there
are often detailed legal frameworks put in place in order to
protect such data. In the United Kingdom the primary entry
point to understanding the protection of electronically stored
sensitive data is the 1998Data Protection Act (Data Protection
Act, 1998) and GDPR requirements (Goddard, 2017).
• Security–The primary concern of a system dealing with the
storage, access and transmission of patient data is that of
security. Any system dealing with provisioning healthcare
data should have security as its primary concern.
• Trust–Trust, as opposed to security, issues involve the results
of the perception of a system’s security on its willingness to
be used. That is, even the perception that a new system will
be less secure than an existing one can lead to a rejection of
that new system. Stakeholders are also often unwilling to
transfer trust to another party, even if that other party is a
representative of the same stakeholder group. Ensuring trust
exists on both a technical and perceptual level is a key
requirement.
Looking at this set of generic principles that a data linkage
enabling architecture should meet we distilled the following set of
design goals:
• The prevention of disclosure of data is paramount.
• The set of data shared must be minimal.
• Data retained and usedmust be on a ‘just in time’ rather than
‘just in case’ basis.
• Data held locally is controlled locally.
• Obligations defined within the system must be translatable
to legal obligations.
• A site is the solely responsible for determining all of its
actions within the system.
• A site can leave exit the system instantly, with no action or
input required from any other parties.
2.2 Technical Requirements
On the technical side the primary concern of the design of the
system was in the removal of reliance on a trusted third party
enabling the linkage of medical data sets. We found that utilizing
the core features and underlying principals of blockchain
technology would meet this key requirement. As outlined in
section 1.1 the core features provided by blockchain as a
technological platform and protocol are security,
decentralization, consensus and immutability. From matching
against these core features we derived the following set of
requirements:
• Security: the system must ensure that invalid entities cannot
request data via the system and data about participating
entities and the results of requests they have made should
remain private.
• Decentralization: No single organization or entity should be
responsible for the provision of linkage services and access to
or modification of the service itself should be on the protocol
level rather than the responsibility of an individual entity
within the system.
• Consensus: participants within the system should, at any
given point in time, agree to what there responsibilities are
with respect to the provision of data, and should have a
common view as to what actions other entities are and have
been performing.
• Immutability: The public record of actions that has been
facilitated by the system should remain permanently
auditable and a matter of public record. We designed the
reference architecture presented in section 3 around these
two core sets of requirements.
2.3 Implementation
In order to demonstrate the validity of our design we
implemented a working prototype of the reference
architecture. This system was implemented on a public test
net of the Ethereum blockchain. Smart contracts encoding the
role and actions of the decentralized trusted third party were
written in the Solidity programming language version 0.7.1 with
surrounding web-based functionality written in the javascript
programming language, in particular utilizing the Web3.js library
for interacting with the Ethereum blockchain.
Deploying and running smart contract based applications on
the live Ethereum main network accrues ‘gas’ fees–market valued
payments made in terms of the number of primitive operations
executed by a call made to a smart contract. Gas fees act to
constrain the resources consumed by the nodes running the
network in terms of the processing required to compute the
outputs of smart contracts at any given time. As such running live
applications is generally unfeasible in terms of costs unless the
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running of the application is backed by a sustainable business
model or income stream (Ranganthan et al., 2018). As an
alternative, and for testing purposes, several test networks
exist, identical in terms of software and operation to the main
Ethereum network, but with the corresponding Ether (the coins,
or units of value, backing the network and used to pay gas fees)
freely or easily obtainable, as opposed to priced on the open
market. We deployed, ran and tested the reference
implementation against the Ropsten test network. This allowed
us to deploy and run test versions of our smart contract
architecture without incurring cost. The implications of
running a version of the system against the main network are
discussed in 4.
3 RESULTS
In this section we present the reference architecture for
blockchain enabled trust-less data linkage. The architecture is
derived from the requirements analysis outlined in section 2 and
a proof-of-concept implementation of this architecture was
engineered and deployed on an Ethereum test network (using
the tooling outlined in 2.3). This section presents the architectural
design along with a description of the components of the
architecture and their roles within the system. We then outline
the flow of data that the system enables and describe the
interaction of the various components. The results of the
design in terms of its conformance to the previously derived
requirements are then examined. Potential future work,
consequences of the design process and issues regarding the
proof-of-concept implementation are further looked at in
section 4.
3.1 Reference Architecture
Figure 1 gives a graphical overview of the reference architecture
that we have specified, designed and implemented. The
components of the diagram and the actions that it enables in
terms of the requesting and linking of a data query are described
in the following sections.
The components of this architecture are as follows.
3.1.1 Entities
The following entities are specified by the reference architecture:
3.1.1.1 Data Consumer
A Data Consumer is an entity or organization which wishes to
receive linkable data sets from participating Data Providers in the
system. The role of the Data Consumer within the system is to
receive valid credentials for participation from an Identity
Provider and to publish Requests to Data Providers to provide
data. The actual sending and receiving of the data itself happens,
post verification and linkage, outside the bounds of this system.
3.1.1.2 Data Provider
A Data Provider is an entity that is responsible for holding and
distributing a given healthcare dataset. The role of the Data
Provider within the system is to process Requests coming
from Data Consumers, to process the results of those Requests
and to compute subsets of linkable identifiers through interaction
with other Data Providers within the system.
3.1.1.3 Blockchain
The underlying Blockchain acts as a canonical source of truth,
hosts the linkage smart contract and is used to record auditable
information regarding actions that have been performed within
FIGURE 1 | A Reference Architecture For Blockchain Native Data Linkage.
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the system. In our reference implementation of this design the
particular blockchain used was an Ethereum test network.
3.1.1.4 Linkage Smart Contract
The Linkage Smart Contract is the piece of decentralized code
that is relied upon to coordinate and process requests passing
through the system. It publishes relevant information to the
underlying blockchain supporting the system, and provides a
canonical mechanism for sending data objects between
participants in the system.
3.1.1.5 Identity Provider
An Identity Provider is an entity whose role it is to verify the
legitimacy of participating actors within the system. There can be
one or more Identity Providers acting within the system. An
Identity Provider grounds the trust that Data Providers have that
Data Consumers are legitimate entities, and vice versa. A Data
Consumer or Data Provider does not need to rely on the
verification provided by a given Identity Provider, but must
rely on at least one such provider acting within the system in
order to be able to interact with other participating entities.
3.1.2 Data Objects
The following data objects are specified by the reference
architecture:
3.1.2.1 Credential Object
A Credential object is a signed message provided by an Identity
Provider attesting to the legitimacy of a participating Data
Consumer. The content of this object is published via the
Linkage Smart Contract.
3.1.2.2 Request Object
The purpose of a Request Object is to specify a request that is
being sent by a Data Consumer to a Data Provider. The object
consists of:
• A query, being a specification of the query that the
originating data consumer wishes to run.
• A list of credential references, specifying the signed
credential objects that can be used to confirm the validity
of the originator of the request.
• A list of data provider identifiers that specify the data
providers that the data consumer wishes to run the query
against.
• A unique identifier for that object, which can be used to
index request objects, in particular to allow the identification
of previous requests from data consumers that may impact
the validity of a current request (for example to protect
against statistical disclosure of identifiable information from
pseudonymized data sets obtained from multiple sources).
3.1.2.3 Linkage Request Object
The role of a Linkage Request object is to initiate interaction
between two Data Providers such that they can compute a subset
of identifiers that are common to both Data Providers and to
constrain the future results returned through enacting the query
contained in a given Request. A Linkage Request object
consists of:
• Request identifier, a link to the request object against which
the linkage is taking place.
• An originating provider id specifying the data provider
sending this linkage request.
• A receiving provider id specifying the data provider that the
originator wishes to compute a linked identifier set against.
3.1.2.4 Warrant Object
AWarrant is the final specification, given to a Data Consumer by
a Data Provider enabling them to query the data held by the Data
Provider. It contains a signed message originating from the Data
Provider and a Request identifier.
3.2 Data Linkage Procedure
The general process for linking data from data providers
following a request from a data consumer proceeds as follows:
1. Prior to the initialization of a data linkage request the data
consumer obtains a valid credential object from an identity
provider. the details of the credential are recorded
on chain.
2. The data consumer constructs a request object pertaining
to a query for a particular set of identifiers and containing a
signed reference to a valid set of credentials and a set of
identifiers of data providers.
3. The data consumer publishes the request object via the
linkage smart contract.
4. Following the publication of a Request object, each Data
Provider for which that Request pertains does the
following:
a. Consumes the request.
b. Independently verifies that the published credentials
within the request are valid.
c. Internally computes the set of identifiers that satisfy the
query portion of the request.
d. Publishes a linkage request object via the linkage smart
contract.
5 Following the registration of a linkage request object, each
data provider which has also internally computed a set of
identifiers pertaining to the query id of the linkage request does
the following:
a. Consumes the linkage request object.
b. Sends an encrypted set of identifiers to the originator of
the linkage request.
c. Receives back a subset of those identifiers that are the
union of those identifiers and the set computed by the
originator of the linkage request.
d. If the request object to which the linkage request relates
contains any data provider identifiers against which the
data provider has not yet computed a linked set of
identifiers then the data provider publishes a
corresponding linkage request object.
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e. Once the data provider has computed subsets against all
other data providers referenced in the query, then a
warrant object is published via the linkage smart
contract that contains signed permission for the data
consumer to send a request for data to that data provider.
6. The originating data consumer then:
a. Consumes any published warrant objects.
b. Sends a data query request to the relevant data consumer
in an out of band channel to the data provider of the
warrant.
c. Receives the relevant query results set.
The mechanisms behind the production and matching of
patient identifiers within a given linkage query may vary
depending on the type of data being linked against and the
general system requirements pertaining to holding that data
(for example any legal constraints on the retention and
representation of such identifiers. In our proof-of-concept
reference implementation we assumed that identifiers were
represented in a universal format across the platform.
3.3 Adherence to Requirements
In section 2 we outlined two sets of requirements that our
reference architecture design needed to exhibit to, falling into
categories of the generic and the technical. Here we outline the
ways in which the architecture adheres to these requirements.
3.3.1 Generic Requirements
• The prevention of disclosure of data is paramount. Within
the operation of the system data at all times remains under
the control of the Data Provider entity that supplies that
data. Additionally the operation of the system is based
around the computation of subsets of identifiers that are
only those linkable with the data sets held by other Data
Providers. It is thus a core principal of the system that it acts
to prevent the disclosure of unnecessary data.
• The set of data shared must be minimal. The role of the
Linkage Request object within the system flow is to allow
Data Provider entities to compute the minimum releasable
subset of identifiers that they should provide to a Warranted
Data Consumer. As such this requirement is met.
• Data retained and used must be on a ‘just in time’ rather
than ‘just in case’ basis. While broadly the retention of data
by the Data Consumer falls outside the remit of the system
as specified here, the fact that there are immutably recorded
and formally specified Warrants specifying the right to
request data, it would be possible to extend the system
such that the Warrant also specified the obligations of the
Data Consumer with respect to the retention of data and to
potentially translate this into a legal obligation (see the
point below).
• Data held locally is controlled locally. At every point in the
operation of the system it is under the control of the Data
Provider as to whether they ultimately release data to the
requesting Data Consumer. The Data Provider is responsible
and has control over the decision to trust the Identity
Provider, the computation of releasable sets of identifiers
through interaction with other Data Providers, the issuing of
the signedWarrant that is supplied by the Data Consumer in
requesting data, and ultimately the final act of releasing data
against that Warrant itself. Hence, at all points, the data that
is held by the provider is controlled by the provider.
• Obligations defined within the system must be translatable
to legal obligations. Although no component of the system
explicitly exhibits the principle of this requirement, the fact
that all actions performed within the system, particularly the
action of publishing a specific Warrant pertaining to the
granting of a Data Consumer the right to request data from
the issuing Data Provider, lends itself to future work in
mapping the specification of this Warrant to a legally sound
contractual obligation specified outside the bounds of the
system.
• A site is the solely responsible for determining all of its
actions within the system. No action within the operation of
the system is automated, and all actions performed by Data
Providers are initiated and processed by themselves. As such
this requirement is met.
• A site can leave exit the system instantly, with no action or
input required from any other parties. Given that it is under
the control of the Data Providers within the system to accept
and process a request for data, and there is no system specific
obligation to continue to act after any given previous action
then leaving the system is simply a case of no longer
participating in it.
In conclusions all of the above generic requirements were
either met in the design and implementation of the system, or are
outside the bounds of the present specification, not prevented by
it and could be enabled through extension of the current
specification.
3.3.2 Technical Requirements
The following technical requirements were derived for the
system:
• Security: the system must ensure that invalid entities cannot
request data via the system and data about participating
entities and the results of requests they have made should
remain private. The act of preventing invalid participants
interacting with the system is assumed by the role of the
Identity Provider which signs Credentials for participants.
The results of requests instantiated through the system are
encoded and transported outside the bounds of the system,
and the communication of intersecting sets of identifiers is
encrypted by the originating Data Provider entities.
• Decentralization: No single organization or entity should be
responsible for the provision of linkage services and access to
or modification of the service itself should be on the protocol
level rather than the responsibility of an individual entity
within the system. Actions that take place within the bounds
of the system are coordinated by the Linkage Smart
Contract. The fact that this smart contract is hosted on
and interacted with via the underlying Ethereum blockchain
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ensures that the coordinating actions of the system remain
decentralized and outside the control of a third party actor.
• Consensus: participants within the system should, at any
given point in time, agree to what there responsibilities are
with respect to the provision of data, and should have a
common view as to what actions other entities are and have
been performing. The actions of the system are specified as a
protocol, with the required actions of entities within the
system clearly specified at a given time. The common view of
the current and previous actions of other entities
participating in the system is coordinated through the
Linkage Smart Contract and results of interaction written
to the underlying Blockchain instance. These components
underpin the element of consensus within the system.
• 1Immutability: The public record of actions that has been
facilitated by the system should remain permanently
auditable and a matter of public record. Again the role of
the Linkage Smart Contract is to coordinate actions of
system components and to record the results on the
underlying Blockchain instance. Where that blockchain is
public then the requirement of immutability is met.
It is a natural outcome of designing the system based on an
underlying blockchain implementation that this set of technical
requirements is met by the architectural specifications.
4 DISCUSSION
We have presented a reference architecture for a data linkage
model that replaces the need for a centralized trusted third party
with a blockchain mediated trust-less system. Core features of
blockchain, particularly decentralization, have allowed us to
replace the trusted third party component present in most
data linkage platforms. The use of blockchain technology to
replace a central trusted authority with a decentralized system
mirrored the primary driver for the original development of
blockchain technology through Bitcoin. In constructing the
requirements for the design of this system we mapped our
derived requirements against the core underlying features
provided by blockchain technology (security, decentralization,
consensus and immutability). This mapping between high-level
systemic features begins to illustrate a conceptual framework that
allows for both assessing the genuine worth of blockchain-
oriented projects and systems, and for informing the design of
such systems. Given a propensity of some projects to buy into the
hype of blockchain and to base system designs around blockchain
technology where it does not perhaps offer any particular benefit,
then formulating an analytic framework around the way in such
features are matched against a potential use case may be
interesting.
While replacing a trusted third party in a system such as
medical data linkage may increase trust in the system in a
technical sense, by removing a potentially insecure or
manipulatable component of the system, there is still the issue
of perceived trust in the system as a whole. Given that the role of
medical data linkage systems is in essence handling highly
sensitive personal data, any data linkage system must engender
trust not just on that technical level but also on the public level.
Potentially the use of blockchain technology could have a
negative impact on perceived public trust in a system on two
fronts. Firstly, as a new technology in general, despite any purely
technical merits, there can be more inherent distrust in the use of
that technology (Mittelstadt, 2017). With blockchain being a
relatively new and groundbreaking technology the may be
natural tendency for critical systems handling sensitive data to
shy away from the use of such technologies for purely perceptual
issues. Additionally a theme of negative media coverage of
blockchain and associated cryptocurrencies could negatively
impact willingness to adopt blockchain technology in general,
apart from it being a generically new technology. Future research
examining both of these factors will be crucial in the integration
of blockchain technologies as components of existing systems,
particularly in the case of health informatics.
The architecture we have described revolves around the roles
of data provider (an entity acting as the custodian and distributor
of data) and data consumer (an entity wishing to process portions
of data) as the key actors in the exchange of medical data. An
additional consideration is the role of the individual patient in
such a system. We have implicitly assumed that these data
consumers would at times be acting as direct intermediaries
between patients and data providers (for example as vetted
apps allowing patients access to portions of their data) and
serving a filtering and management role between individuals
and their data. . Where the patient assumes the role of data
consumer more directly (i.e., can request data directly from a
provider for their own use), the specific implementation of the
architecture may need to be changed to accommodate both the
increased load on the system brought about by there being a large
number of consumer entities (i.e., the individual patients) and the
potential of additional ethico-legal requirements placed on the
system though the direct involvement of patients, which would be
dependant on the jurisdictions in which the system was being
deployed.
The reference implementation we built of this trust-less data
linkage architecture was developed using the Ethereum
blockchain and associated tooling. The use of the public
Ethereum network for such a system raises a number of
points regarding costs, alternatives, business model
implications and performance issues. While we deployed our
reference architecture against one of the Ethereum test networks,
meaning that there was no incurred costs in terms of deploying
and running the smart-contract code base, such networks offer no
guarantees of availability or persistence of data, nor the
economically grounded security guarantees offered by the
main network. As such deploying the architecture as it stands
for use in a real world scenario would incur the costs associated
with running applications against the main Ethereum network. In
practice then the long term deployment and use of the system
would require a sustainable business model, either in terms of
support from a research or healthcare organization or potentially
a pay-per-use or pay-per-volume pricing model. However the
market based nature of the fee structure of the Ethereum network
is such that the cost of performing smart contract operations at a
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org October 2021 | Volume 4 | Article 6673889
Cunningham et al. Blockchain Native Data Linkage
given time is in essence determined by the current level of use of
the network. At times where the network is under heavy load fees
can increase significantly. This potentially hinders the consistent
use of the network as the foundation of a research tool. Going
hand-in-hand with this issue is the fact performance (measured
in terms of the time it takes to process a transaction on the
network) is not guaranteed, and is a factor of both market-based
pricing and the fact that the scalability of the network as a whole is
limited and there are ongoing development efforts to address it
(Park et al., 2020). Both of these factors suggest that use of the
Ethereum network as an application layer may be better suited to
applications that are immediately transactional in terms of cost
(such as distributed market places, for example) as opposed to
service-oriented applications were costs are assumed to be more
constant. Alternative blockchain networks and implementations
exist, potentially offering better solutions in terms of cost and
efficiency. In particular we have looked at the relatively new
Avalanche protocol, and its associated public blockchain
deployment and novel consensus mechanism (Rocket, 2018),
which could potentially address these issues. Further
explorations of the trade-offs between blockchain
implementations and the implications that their use would
have on the design and running of data linkage systems is an
avenue for future research.
A consideration to be had in a practical deployment of the
architecture would be whether to deploy it on a fully public
blockchain instance or a private or hybridized one. There is
explicitly nothing in the architecture that precludes a public
deployment (i.e., the recording, on-chain, of identifiable
personal information), but ethico-legal considerations and
public perception may point toward the use of a private
instance (where participants in the network are invited in
and blockchain data is not publicly accessible) may be more
appealing. The choice of Ethereum as an implementation and
deployment platform may mean that there is an implicit choice
made with regards to the underlying consensus mechanism that
such a practical deployment of the architecture would use.
Ethereum currently uses proof-of-work consensus where
‘miners’ spend computational resource competing to produce
canonical blocks in the Ethereum blockchain. While this is
justifiable in the case of a public blockchain where the use of
the computational resource is used as a means to underpin the
security of the system, if the architecture were to be deployed on
a private instance of a blockchain, the use of such a proof-of-
work consensus mechanism to should be considered overly
complex and perhaps wasteful. In this case alternative
implementations utilizing more efficient consensus
mechanisms would be more applicable, for example the
Hyperledger technology stack, which is more suited to such
deployments (Androulaki et al., 2018).
The research we have presented has demonstrated the
feasibility of applying blockchain technologies to problem
spaces which benefit from the removal of entities or
components that rely on an inherent degree of trust to
maintain the integrity of the system as a whole. In general the
underlying features provided by blockchain technology, namely
security, decentralization, consensus and immutability can
provide a conceptual framework for leveraging blockchain as a
tool for addressing outstanding system design problems. In the
particular instance of data linkage, the application of blockchain
technology can provide security, consensus and immutibility to
an area that is crucial for pushing forward research while
maintaining patient privacy.
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